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FOREWORD TO THE NEUROSCIENCE, LAW & 
GOVERNMENT SYMPOSIUM 
Jane Campbell Moriarty∗ 
It is with much pleasure that I write the foreword for this 
Symposium in the Akron Law Review.  The authors were each 
presenters at the Neuroscience, Law & Government Conference, held at 
The University of Akron School of Law in September, 2008.  The 
articles in this edition of Akron Law Review are as diverse as the 
presentations themselves, and provide a fascinating glimpse into various 
ways in which neuroscience is making inroads in both law and 
government. 
The explosion of neuroscience and neuroimaging discoveries this 
decade is nothing short of remarkable, leading one prominent scientist to 
term the last several years “the decade of the mind.”1  Neuroscience has 
become a dominant aspect of scientific inquiry—there are now over 
35,000 members of the Society for Neuroscience, a group which 
integrates scholarly work from scientific, mathematic, psychological, 
medical, and computer-based disciplines.2  The emergence of functional 
magnetic resonance imaging, commonly termed “fMRI,” has 
substantially affected basic cognitive neuroscience research.3  Indeed, 
according to an article published in Nature in 2008, it appears as though 
there are roughly 19,000 peer-reviewed articles that may have used 
fMRI in some capacity.4 
 
∗  Professor, The University of Akron School of Law, and Chair, Neuroscience, Law & Government 
Conference at The University of Akron School of Law, September 2008. 
 1. Steven Rose, Introduction: The New Brain Sciences, in THE NEW BRAIN SCIENCES: 
PERILS AND PROSPECTS 3 (Dai Reese & Steven Rose eds., 2004). 
 2. JONATHAN D. MORENO, MIND WARS: BRAIN RESEARCH AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 17 
(2006). 
 3. Nikos K. Logothetis, What We Can Do and What We Cannot Do with fMRI, 453 NATURE 
869, 869 (2008). 
 4. Id. 
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There are numerous instances where neuroscience intersects with 
law or government and the Conference at the University of Akron 
School of Law concerned many of them, including the use of 
neuroscience to detect deception as a defense to a crime, and as a 
method by which to explain the reason for a juvenile’s unlawful 
behavior. In addition, Conference speakers considered the role of 
neuroscience in legislation related to gender issues, whether it should be 
used as part of death penalty decision-making, and the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment implications of neuroscience evidence. 
The legal and legislative systems have begun to rely on 
neuroscience in various types of decision-making.  Without question, the 
relationship between the disciplines will become more enmeshed as 
more data is generated by neuroscientists.  Are we ready for this 
potential sea change that will be both rich and strange?5 
The Symposium begins with the comments of Professor Henry T. 
Greely, the keynote speaker, who provides an annotated version of his 
presentation.  His talk focused on five ways neuroscience might affect 
the law:  the areas of prediction, mind reading, responsibility, treatment, 
and enhancement.6  Professor Greely sketches a glimpse of where the 
science might bring us, while recognizing the uncertainty of predicting 
the future. 
Professor Greely first discusses the use of neuroscience as a 
predictive element in the law—what if we could use neuroscience to 
predict who will be likely to develop conditions such as Alzheimer’s 
disease or schizophrenia or who will become dangerous psychopaths?  
Should the law allow employers and others to use this kind of predictive 
information?  Should it use these predictions itself at trial or to stop 
people before they commit dangerous acts?  If so, how? 
Neuroscience also intersects with law, Professor Greely argues, by 
the use of neuroimaging methods, such as fMRI to view the brain in 
action; in a sense, to “read minds.”  From experiments to determine what 
objects people are seeing (or visualizing) to studies to determine if 
minds can move prosthetic limbs, neuroscience is growing at a rapid 
pace.  Other, more legally-oriented uses of neuroscience are likely as 
well—to detect pain, bias, and deception.  Much of the Conference 
focused on the neuro-detection of deception and many of the articles in 
this Symposium discuss this issue. 
 
 5. Cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST, Act I, Scene II. 
 6. Henry T. Greely, Law and the Revolution in Neuroscience: An Early Look Across the 
Field, 42 AKRON L. REV. 687(2009). 
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Whether neuroscience has a role in the determination of legal 
responsibility is a subject about which there is much scholarship and 
current discussion.  Noting the extreme polarization between those who 
believe neuroscience will replace the law and those who believe it 
provides nothing new, Greely suggests a likely middle path, where it 
will make a difference in some cases, but will be unlikely to lead to 
major changes in our view of criminal responsibility. 
The fourth intersection between neuroscience and law may be in 
the area of treatment, Professor Greely writes.  We may be able to 
improve human health by finding better ways of managing disease.  But 
might we also find ways to treat such disorders as anti-social behavior?  
And if so, what dangers does such knowledge present?  Should we 
forcibly treat criminals with neuro-techniques that pose grave dangers to 
those “treated”?  Citing the current treatment of sex offenders with drugs 
that bring about “chemical castration,” Professor Greely wonders about 
the potential side effects and voices concerns about such brain-based 
treatment. 
Finally, Professor Greely’s keynote presentation delves into the use 
of neuroscience drugs to enhance performance.  Some drugs are 
currently being developed to enhance memory, while other machine-
brain interfaces (such as cochlear implants for hearing loss) are already 
in use.  But rather than simply treating disabled people, what if we 
decide to use these drugs simply to enhance normal abilities?  What is 
the proper role of law for regulating such enhancements? 
In sum, Professor Greely’s article looks into the future and, while 
claiming not to know what the future will actually bring, argues that the 
law will soon have to deal with neuroscience issues. 
Several of the articles in this symposium consider different aspects 
of the intersection of neuroscience and testing for deception.  Professor 
Joelle Moreno’s article provides an important philosophic link for those 
thinking about the role of the academy in evaluating novel scientific 
evidence such as neuroscience.  Noting that “profound validity questions 
divide cognitive neuroscientists,” Professor Moreno cautions against 
ready admission of cognitive neuroscience evidence, recognizing that 
the images presented may be far more persuasive to judges and juries 
than they legitimately should be.  Quoting studies on the effect of 
neuroscience evidence in forming opinions, she reminds readers that 
3
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cognitive neuroscience evidence can “strongly sway opinion, beyond 
what the evidence can support.”7 
My article on the neuroscience of deception primarily looks at the 
fMRI studies of neuroimaging and discusses the reasons why such 
studies do not yet meet standards of evidentiary trustworthiness.  
Drawing on the lessons from courts’ decisions to admit much forensic 
science without proof of its validity or reliability, the article argues 
against ready admission of such evidence in the courtroom.  Rather, it 
counsels in favor of an informal moratorium, while scientists and their 
critics consider and debate the neuroscience of deception, and other 
scholars consider the moral, jurisprudential, and ethical implications of 
such evidence.8 
Dr. Dov Fox’s in-depth article explains how the forced use of 
neuroscience to detect deception violates the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination.9  Drawing the historical distinction in Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence between testimonial and physical evidence, 
Dr. Fox recognizes that brain imaging is “difficult to classify because it 
promises distinctly testimonial-like information about the contents of a 
persons’ mind . . . in demonstrably physical-like form . . . .”10  
Nonetheless, he concludes that our thoughts are much more “part of us” 
than our blood.  So while our blood can be taken from us without 
violating the Fifth Amendment, the same is not true of our thoughts. 
While Dr. Fox focuses on the Fifth Amendment implications of 
forced use of neuroscience, Professor Christian Halliburton delves 
deeply into the Fourth Amendment’s implications with respect to 
neuroscience use.11  Arguing in favor of an expanded notion of property 
as an essential aspect of human identity, Professor Halliburton 
challenges existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as being too 
narrowly cabined in its ability to protect the government from forcibly 
protecting the thoughts emanating from one’s mind.  Suggesting we 
“immolate” the current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that centers on 
a privacy notion, he argues in favor of a personhood theory of property 
 
 7. Joëlle Anne Moreno, The Future of Neuroimaged Lie Detection and the Law,  42 AKRON 
L. REV. 717, 738 (2009) (quoting David P. McCabe & Alan D. Castel, Seeing is Believing, The 
Effect of Brain Images on Judgments of Scientific Reasoning, 107 COGNITION 343, 349 (2008). 
 8. Jane Campbell Moriarty, Visions of Deception: Neuroimages and the Search for Truth, 42 
AKRON L. REV. 739 (2009). 
 9. Dov Fox, The Right to Silence as Protecting Mental Control, 42 AKRON L. REV. 763 
(2009). 
 10. Id. at 794. 
 11. Christian M. Halliburton, How Privacy Killed Katz: A Tale of Cognitive Freedom and the 
Property of Personhood as Fourth Amendment Norm, 42 AKRON L. REV. 803 (2009). 
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to apply to the Fourth Amendment, drawing heavily from Margaret 
Radin’s theories.12  Professor Halliburton calls for a ban on the 
government’s non-consensual use of neuroscience on individuals, 
arguing that “the cognitive landscape of our ideas and intentions are so 
closely bound up with the self that they are essential to our ongoing 
existence and manifestation of a fully developed personal identity.”13 
Professor Michael Perlin, an international authority on the insanity 
defense, discusses the future implications of neuroimaging technology in 
insanity defense cases.14  Building upon his belief expressed in books 
and articles that “sanism” and mythic beliefs infect the jurisprudence of 
the insanity defense, Professor Perlin questions whether neuroimaging 
will change those concerns.15  Since the technology is both vivid and 
quantifiable, it has the potential to counter many of the myths of the 
insanity defense.  Nonetheless, Professor Perlin is ambivalent as to 
whether neuroimaging will truly affect the insanity defense or whether 
the prejudices and stereotyping related to the defense will simply 
accommodate this new evidence.  His article provides an interesting and 
thoughtful analysis premised on a long history of scholarship in the area 
of behavioral science. 
Professor Aronson’s article focuses on the connection between 
neuroscience and juvenile justice.  He discusses whether the new 
neuroscience provides sufficiently reliable evidence to establish 
meaningful differences between adolescent and adult brains and whether 
science should mitigate the culpability of juvenile defendants and 
prevent them from being tried in the adult criminal justice system.16  He 
concludes that there is still too much scientific disagreement about the 
relationship between brain structure and decision-making capacity to 
even contemplate using neuroscience in this way.  He notes that the few 
studies that have shown some link have had significant methodological 
flaws.  In the end, Aronson is not convinced that neuroscience will be 
able to explain adequately why some teenagers commit crimes and 
others do not because so many other factors are involved in anti-social 
behavior, especially socioeconomic issues.  He concludes by suggesting 
 
 12. Id. at 840-47, discussing Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. 
REV. 957 (1982). 
 13. Halliburton, supra note 11, at  869-70. 
 14. Michael Perlin, “His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill”: How Will Jurors 
Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 885 (2009). 
 15. For more on these subjects, see id. at 887 n.8. 
 16. Jay D. Aronson, Neuroscience and Juvenile Justice, 42 AKRON L. REV. 917 (2009). 
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that our desire to find a scientific solution to questions of justice may be 
fundamentally misguided. 
Professor Julie Seaman’s remarks provide an interesting 
comparison between the “black box” of the jury room and the “black 
box” of the mind in her essay, questioning what will be revealed if 
neuroscience evidence on truthfulness is admitted at trial.17  Discussing 
the recognition that jury nullification has often had the salutary effect of 
acting as a safety valve for exceptional cases, she muses about how 
neuroscience evidence relating to truthfulness might affect the exercise 
of that role. 
Professor Tovino’s annotated remarks focus on the newly 
developing role of neuroscience in legislation about women’s medical 
conditions.18  Discussing some of the small neuroscience studies 
addressing post-partum mood disorders, premenstrual dysphoric 
disorders, and eating disorders, Professor Tovino explains how 
advocates have begun to use the studies to attempt to affect legislation.  
As her research reveals, advocates are using neuroscience to help 
establish a physiological basis for these disorders so that these 
conditions will be given parity with other physical disorders.  
Previously, these disorders were considered solely mental disorders, 
which categorization limits the amount of medical coverage available for 
prevention and treatment.  While these attempts to use neuroscience are 
laudable, Professor Tovino, like many of the scholars in this 
Symposium, cautions against inferring too much from the small, few 
studies that exist to date. 
This symposium, in its variety of articles, touches upon many of the 
key issues as neuroscience moves into both law and government. 
 
 17. Julie Seaman, Black Boxes: fMRI Lie Detection and the Role of the Jury, 42 AKRON L. 
REV. 931 (2009). 
 18. Stacey A. Tovino, Remarks: Neuroscience, Gender, and Law, 42 AKRON L. REV. 941 
(2009). 
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